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Flexible versus Simple Trade-in Strategy for Remanufacturing 
 
 
Abstract: Some enterprises recently start to offer the flexible trade-in option to attract customers 
from competitors, in contrast to the simple one that only allows them to return used products to 
the same manufacturers for new. Based on analytical and numerical analyses, this study compares 
the environmental impacts of two trade-in strategies (simple versus flexible) in combination with 
different carbon tax policies. From the perspective of consumer switching behavior, a Hotelling 
model with two market segments is established. Under the flexible trade-in strategy, the carbon 
emission of enterprises turns out to be significantly higher than that under the simple trade-in 
strategy. An appropriate carbon tax policy, especially with preferential tax rates on green products, 
is capable of guiding enterprises to choose a more environment-friendly trade-in strategy included 
in the model. The findings fill the research gap in comparing the pros and cons of simple and 
flexible trade-in strategies in terms of sustainable development, and provide managers and policy-
makers the insights on how to promote the healthy development of the remanufacturing industry 
with trade-in strategizing and carbon taxation. 
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1. Introduction 
With the aggravation of global warming and environmental issues, green economy and 
sustainable development are becoming the consensus of people around the world. In operations 
and production management, more and more enterprises pay close attention to corporate 
sustainability and social responsibility (Walker, Klassen, Sarkis et al., 2014). As one effective 
means, remanufacturing is distinct from traditional manufacturing in that the raw materials come 
from used products. Rather than dumping them, enterprises disassemble used products and recover 
the parts that can be processed for new products (Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006). Through the reuse 
of raw materials and parts, manufacturers effectively cut greenhouse gas emission (Chen & Chang, 
2012; Savaskan, Bhattacharya, & van Wassenhove, 2004). 
As a sustainable development endeavor, remanufacturing is supported by governments all 
over the world. For example, the EU's End-of-life Vehicles (ELVs) Directive and Electronic 
Equipment Directive came into effect in 2000 and 2003, respectively (Mazzanti & Zoboli, 2006). 
Maryland and Californian in the United States passed legislations to impose electronic waste 
recycling fees (Equalization, 2018). Canada and Japan are the two countries that first subsidized 
the remanufacturing industry (Hicks, Dietmar, & Eugster, 2005). In 2008, China's National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) initiated 14 pilot projects to support the 
remanufacturing of auto parts (Wang, Chang, Chen et al., 2014). 
One of the major challenges facing the remanufacturing industry today is the acquisition of 
used products, for which trade-in is indispensable (Gu & Tagaras, 2014; Wang, Chang, Chen et al., 
2014). In 2009, the Chinese government introduced a trade-in subsidy to help the remanufacturing 
industry get more used products from customers. This allows the firms in question to offer 
consumers incentives in form of rebates or discounts when they return used products for new 
(especially appliances). Such transactions provide a win-win solution: they save consumers money, 
give remanufacturers “raw” materials, and promote the sales of newer-generation products (Liu, 
Zhai, & Chen, 2019). 
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Smartphones emerge as fast-upgrading consumer electronics, and manufacturers around the 
world offer all kinds of trade-in programs. Mainly for its iPhones, Apple first launched the first 
Reuse and Recycling Program in February 2016. When other firms like Samsung and Huawei 
offered similar options, Apple further allowed consumers to return used smartphones of other 
brands for its latest products1. Compared with the original practice, this flexible strategy helps 
Apple attract consumers from its rivals. To get their market shares back, of course, competitors 
soon implemented similar programs. 
The extant research only considers a single manufacturer with the simple trade-in strategy to 
recycle its own products (Cao, Bo, & He, 2018; Huang, 2018). Whereas the findings provide 
helpful insights, they are limited due to the fact that multiple manufacturers in the same arena tend 
to pursue the flexible trade-in strategy instead. It is still unclear which trade-in strategy, simple or 
flexible, puts the whole remanufacturing industry in a better position for sustainable development 
from both environmental and financial aspects. In addition to the trade-in subsidy as the positive 
incentive for remanufacturing, countries like Finland, Norway, Japan and Mexico impose carbon 
tax as a negative incentive on all enterprises to reduce green-house gas emission (Carl & Fedor, 
2016; Haites, 2018). Therefore, this study develops various Hotelling models to compare the two 
trade-in strategies in the context of carbon taxation. The results of numerical analyses yield a more 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon and useful insights for the healthier 
development of the remanufacturing industry. 
The remainder of this article is organized as below. First, it lays out the research background 
on remanufacturing and trade-in, carbon tax, and Hotelling model. Then, it describes model 
development and equilibrium analysis. The modeling enables the comparison between simple and 
flexible trade-in strategies under different carbon tax settings. The findings are discussed in terms 
and theoretical and practical implications, followed by the conclusion. 
 
1 https://www.apple.com.cn/shop/trade-in 
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2. Research Background 
2.1 Remanufacturing and trade-in 
As a practice of collecting used products and processing them to the condition like new 
(Ovchinnikov, Blass, & Raz, 2014), remanufacturing is an innovative business strategy that 
combines elements of marketing (Atasu, Sarvary, & Wassenhove, 2008) and environment 
protection (Govindan, Parra, Rubio et al., 2019). For enterprises to strengthen competitive 
advantage, researchers consider the differentiation of utility and price of remanufactured goods 
from the new (Ferrer, 2010), production planning and product pricing under monopoly and 
duopoly situations (Ferrer & Swaminathan, 2006), various supply chain leaders (Choi, Li, & Xu, 
2013), and multiple cycles (Ferguson & Toktay, 2010). Remanufacturing may create new 
opportunities for enterprises, but they face various challenges especially the low recycling rate 
(Ferguson & Toktay, 2010). 
To encourage consumers to return used products, the remanufacturing industry implements 
all kinds of trade-in programs. Initially, the simple trade-in strategy enables manufacturers to 
recycle their own products, which then ushers in the flexible strategy that allows consumers to 
return competitors’ products. Remanufacturers make different levels of profits from refurbishing, 
repairing and reprocessing used products. Table 1 reports the rebate amounts offered by the trade-
in programs, which vary across program hosts and product brands, of four major smartphone 
manufacturers. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Though many enterprises implement flexible trade-in programs for certain products, simple 
trade-in programs are still common. Except for smartphones, for instance, Apple gives no rebate 
to consumers when they return other brands of PCs or smartwatches to its Reuse and Recycling 
Program. Its competitors in the PC industry, Dell and Lenovo, adopt the flexible trade-in strategy 
in contrast. In the printer industry, HP launched a flexible trade-in program to recycle qualified 
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non-HP laser and inkjet printers2, but Canon only implemented the simple trade-in program for its 
own products3. Similarly, many enterprises in different industries face a choice between simple 
and flexible trade-in strategies. 
A manufacturer may pursue flexible trade-in to increase its market share. However, is the 
whole industry better off if all competitors switch to flexible trade-in or hold on to simple trade-
in? This study attempts to answer this question with the game theory approach considering all 
stakeholders, including manufacturers, consumers, and government. 
2.2 Hotelling model 
In the closed-loop supply chain context, researchers consider all kinds of competitions 
between two entities, such as new and used products (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019), OEM- and re-
manufacturers (Dou, Guo, Zhang et al., 2019), platform-run and third-party sellers (Cao, Xu, Bian 
et al., 2019), regular and trade-in retailers (Huang, 2018), and regular and direct (i.e., manufacturer) 
retailers (Saha, Sarmah, & Moon, 2016). However, few have examined the competition between 
two firms that produce both new and remanufactured products. 
The Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1990) is capable of modeling the game between two 
competitors (Chen & Liu, 2014; Chen & Sheu, 2013). It has been used to model the competition 
between OEM- and re-manufacturers (Pazoki & Zacciyr, 2019; Wu, 2013), retailer and e-tailer 
(He, Xiong, & Lin, 2016), and regular and direct (i.e., manufacturer) retailers (Ofek, Katona, & 
Sarvary, 2011). This study uses the Hotelling model to simulate the competition between two firms 
with remanufacturing capacity. 
For optimizing trade-in programs in terms of corporate profitability, researchers consider 
pricing strategy (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019), channel selection (Feng, Li, Xu et al., 2019); (Cao, 
Wang, Duo et al., 2018), recycler choice (Cao, Bo, & He, 2018; Miao, Fu, Xia et al., 2017), rebate 
 
2 Source: https://h41201.www4.hp.com/WMCF.Web/us/en/landing/portal/trade-in/ 
3 Source: http://www.canon.com.cn/support/announce/products/5747.html 
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mechanism design (Cao, Xu, Bian et al., 2019; Ray, Boyaci, & Aras, 2011), and product 
upgrading/updating (Liu, Zhai, & Chen, 2019; Yin & Tang, 2014). Customer purchasing behavior 
is also examined for the economic valuation of remanufacturing efficiency (Zhang & Zhang, 2018). 
These studies address how different trade-in configurations affect the decision-making and 
profitability of manufacturers. Yet few have investigated the situation in which two competitors 
engage in trade-in activities simultaneously with the same or different strategies (i.e., simple vs. 
flexible). 
To capture different types of consumers, the modeling may incorporate market segmentation. 
Feng, Li, Xu et al. (2019) explored the firms’ optimal trade-in policies in a competitive 
environment based on two market segments: new consumers and regular consumers. Furthermore, 
this study compares different trade-in strategies by establishing a Hotelling model considering the 
market segmentation based on the ownership of different brands of used products. 
2.3 Carbon tax 
In addition to the market competition, remanufacturers need to consider environment-related 
government policy in strategizing trade-in. To control and reduce total green-house gas from 
production, policy-makers impose the cost of emission on manufacturers with carbon tax and cap-
and-trade (Barragán-Beaud, Pizarro-Alonso, Xylia et al., 2018). Though both mechanisms are 
devised to price CO2 emission, carbon tax exerts a more direct intervention over the total amount 
of emission, whereas cap-and-trade largely relies on market control (Chai, Xiao, Lai et al., 2018; 
Wittneben, 2009). For illustrative purposes, this study focuses on carbon tax as an exemplary 
government policy to examine how the regulatory factor impacts corporate decision-making 
regarding remanufacturing and trade-in.  
While trade-in subsidy is only for remanufacturing, carbon tax applies to all production (Cao, 
He, & Liu, 2019). Thus carbon tax strikes a balance between environment protection and economic 
development at a larger scale (Yang, Liu, Ji et al., 2016). When the remanufacturing rate is still 
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relatively low compared with regular production, carbon tax helps reduce the total emission more 
quickly than other policies (Zhu, Ren, Chu et al., 2019). On the consumer side, levying carbon tax 
at a reasonable level shifts the demand from brand new products to remanufactured ones due to 
price differentiation (Pazoki & Zacciyr, 2019). 
Like most enterprises, the two manufacturers in the Hotelling model of this study make both 
brand new and remanufactured products. Widely used in the real world, carbon tax motivates 
enterprises to engage in remanufacturing for emission reduction (Cao, He, & Liu, 2019). Therefore, 
carbon tax is incorporated in modeling to see how it affects corporate decision-making regarding 
trade-in. In particular, simple and flexible trade-in strategies are distinct in their means (high vs. 
low degrees of remanufacturing) and ends (to upgrade/update products for existing customers vs. 
to attract new customers). The two strategies have different implications for the fulfillment of 
environmental responsibility imposed by carbon tax. 
As a cleaner production approach, remanufacturing yields less environmental impacts than 
regular production. Carbon tax, often seen as an effective climate policy, encourages enterprises 
to pursue remanufacturing for financial benefits. Improving the first-period tax price always 
reduces the total emission, but improving the second-period tax price may increase the total 
emission (Dou, Guo, Zhang et al., 2019). A well-designed carbon tax promotes remanufacturing 
from both economic and environmental aspects. This study examines how carbon tax affects trade-
in program implementation, especially the choice between simple and flexible strategies, for 
optimal industrywide outcomes. 
 
3. Basic Model 
3.1 Trade-in and Remanufacturing 
There are two enterprises: enterprise i and enterprise s in a competitive relationship, and they 
make products in the same line but somewhat differentiated (e.g., smartphones of different 
operating systems). The two enterprises make brand new products as well as remanufactured ones. 
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Based on the conditions of used products collected from consumers, an enterprise may choose to 
refurbish, repair or reprocess each. To encourage consumers to recycle the used products, both 
enterprises implement trade-in programs that allow them to buy new products at discount prices. 
In theory, each enterprise has three trade-in options: none, simple and flexible. They lead to 
the six combinations between two enterprises as shown in Table 2. Take a smartphone 
manufacturer, for instance, it may choose not to recycle used products at all. Environment-
unfriendly, such a strategy is weak at retaining existing customers as well. Once one enterprise 
allows customers to trade in used products for new, the other will almost certainly follow suit or 
lost a significant proportion of market share. Thus, Combinations e and f are unstable, and this 
study focuses on Combinations a-d. Combination a represents the baseline scenario in which the 
whole industry does not engage in remanufacturing through trade-in. In Combination b, both 
enterprises only recycle the used products made by themselves. Combination c is mixed in which 
one enterprise implements a flexible trade-in program while the other sticks to the simple one. In 
Combination d, both pursue the flexible trade-in strategy to attract customers from competitors. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Enterprises give consumers discounts in various forms (e.g., price reduction, cash, gift card) 
when they trade in used products for new ones. The discount amount may vary depending on the 
condition of each used product. Before actual transactions, however, enterprises do not know 
product conditions, nor are consumers aware of valuation criteria. They can only use the average 
value for estimation, which can be found on the Internet for well-known products. In this study, 
the average amount of trade-in discount is denoted as 𝑣𝑗𝑗  . In addition, consumers may save 
furthermore by purchasing cheaper remanufactured products, of which the quality is a little bit 
lower than brand new ones but still acceptable. 
Assumption 1. New products and remanufactured products are of different qualities and prices. 
Assumption 2. Enterprises give the same total discount to consumers for the same model of used 
product. 
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Consuming fewer resources than regular production, remanufacturing always benefits 
enterprises financially (Zhu, Ren, Chu et al., 2019). Of course, used products are not of the same 
conditions, leading to different salvage values. In this study, the average salvage value is denoted 
as 𝑏𝑗𝑗. Through simple trade-in, an enterprise collects the used products made by itself and directly 
works on them. Apple, for instance, turns old iPhones into certified refurbished products. Through 
flexible trade-in, an enterprise collects used products of its competitors but may contract third-
party resellers to make uncertified refurbished products. As certified products are pricier than 
uncertified ones, remanufacturing yields different profit margins for simple and flexible trade-in 
programs. 
3.2 Consumer Behavior and Trade-in 
Strategic consumers are considered in this study: each evaluates the utilities of purchase 
options and chooses the one of the maximum utility. When a consumer decides to buy a new 
product from enterprise j, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠} , the individual has two options: trading in old for new or 
regular purchase. Figure 1 shows the four buying options and the corresponding utilities to 
consumers. Each consumer’s demand for a new product in one cycle is a constant, and an 
individual only uses one product at a time. Once consumers buy new products, their used products 
have little value to them (i.e., value = 0). 
Assumption 3. Each consumer has one used product, which is of no value to the person after 
buying a new product. 
Presented the trade-in opportunity offered by enterprise j, consumers who decide to purchase 
its new products are likely to recycle used ones for discounts. As shown in Figure 1, the value of 
used products to consumers is 0 if not recycled at the purchase of new products. Consumers’ utility 
derived from buying new products made by enterprise j is denoted as 𝑢𝑗 , the price of new products 
made by enterprise j denoted as Pj, the total trade-in discount from enterprise j denoted as 𝑣𝑗𝑗  
and mismatch cost denoted as 𝑡𝑥 or 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) for the consumer located at x. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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To consumers, purchasing the products without recycling used products is always inferior to 
the trade-in options offered by enterprises i and s. Strategic consumers will exclude the undesirable 
option first, and choose among the rest to maximize the utility. Depending on whether each 
enterprise implements a simple or flexible trade-in program, consumers may make different 
purchase decisions for the pursuit of maximum utility. 
3.3 The Basic Model-a 
Enterprises i and s manufacture horizontally differentiated products, to which consumers have 
different preferences. A standard Hotelling setup is used to model the market competition between 
two enterprises. We assume enterprise i and enterprise s to be respectively situated at locations 0 
and 1 on a line of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line, each owning the 
product made by either enterprise. 
Table 3 lists the notations in mathematical modeling. The utility a consumer derives, denoted 
as 𝑈𝑗 , is affected by product price 𝑃𝑗 , product utility 𝑢𝑗  , and disutility from the product-
preference mismatch. The closer consumers are to the Hotelling line, the less mismatch between 
their preferences and the products in question. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
As shown in Figure 2, the utility for a consumer located at x from each product can be 
formulated as 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 , (1) 
 𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 , (2) 
where 𝑢𝑗  is the value derived from the new product, and tx represents the mismatch cost. A 
consumer located at x will compare 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑈𝑠. If 𝑈𝑖 > 𝑈𝑠, the consumer will choose enterprise 
i to maximize the utility. The profit function of the two enterprises can be formulated as 
 𝜋𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗)𝑞𝑗 , (3) 
where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}, 𝐶𝑗 is the cost of enterprises j manufacturing a new product and 𝑞𝑗 the numbers 
of consumers who purchase products from enterprise j. As in the standard setup, by letting 𝑈𝑖 =
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𝑈𝑠, the indifferent consumer’s location can be defined as 𝑥
𝑎 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑆)+𝑡
2𝑡
. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent consumers 
choose enterprise i’s products and the rest choose enterprise s’. The profit function of the two 
enterprises can be specified as 
 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖)𝑥
𝑎 , (4) 
 𝜋𝑠 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠)(1 − 𝑥
𝑎). (5) 
 
4. Equilibrium Analysis 
In this section, three cases of enterprises’ trade-in strategies are discussed, in which the market 
is segmented into two by competing enterprises. For each enterprise, the consumers who own its 
products comprise the loyal market segment, and consumers who own the competitor’s product 
comprise the new market segment. Interestingly, the loyal market segment of enterprise i is also 
the new market segment of enterprise s. Then the whole market can be divided into two parts, the 
loyal market segments for enterprises i and s, respectively, denoted as market segments 1 and 2. 
The size of market segment 1 in terms of the number of consumers is 𝛼 , and that of market 
segment 2 is 1 − 𝛼. 
In Case 1, each enterprise adopts the simple trade-in strategy. It is replaced by both enterprises 
with the flexible strategy in Case 2. Case 3 features a mixture of simple and flexible trade-in 
options offered by two competitors to consumers. 
4.1 Case 1 
In Case 1, only consumers who own used products made by enterprise j can trade them in for 
its new products. Figure 3 integrates the Hotelling lines corresponding to two market segments: 
each enterprise offers the simple trade-in opportunity to its loyal market segment consumers with 
a particular price-utility combination for upgrading to new products. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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In market segment 1 where people own used products made by enterprise i, consumers can 
participate in its trade-in program, or purchase enterprise s’ products. Similarly, in market 
segment 2 where people own used products made by enterprise s, consumers can upgrade to its 
new products, or purchase enterprise i’s products. The utilities consumers derive from purchasing 
without trade-in are shown in eq. (1) and (2). When consumers make purchases through trade-in, 
the utilities change. For consumers in market segment 1, the utility they derive from trade-in with 
enterprise i can be reformulated as 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖 . (6) 
For consumers in market segment 2, the utility they derive from trade-in with enterprise s can 
be reformulated as 
 𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠𝑠. (7) 
By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both market segment, indifferent consumer’s locations in two market 
segments can be defined as 𝑥1
𝑏 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡
 and 𝑥2
𝑏 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
 . In market 
segment 1, consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent 
consumers in segment 1 will choose enterprise i, and the rest choose enterprise s. In market 
segment 2, the situation is similar. 
In Case 1, two enterprises still pursue the maximal profit. Considering the total discount and 
the changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑏 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝑥1
𝑏 + (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖)(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝑏 , (8) 
 𝜋𝑠
𝑏 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠)𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝑏) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝑏). (9) 
Solving the first-order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprises yields the 
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. When both enterprises take a simple trade-in strategy, the equilibrium prices are 
𝑃𝑖
𝑏∗ = 𝐶𝑖 +
𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, 
𝑃𝑠
𝑏∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, 
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the equilibrium sales are 
𝑞𝑖
𝑏∗ =
𝐾2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
, 
𝑞𝑠
𝑏∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑏∗, 
the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are 
𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑏∗ =
2𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, 
𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑏∗ =
2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, 
and the equilibrium profits are 
𝜋𝑖
𝑏∗ =
𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
𝜋𝑠
𝑏∗ =
𝛼(𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠, 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1, and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1. 
Proof：All proofs are included in Appendix A. □ 
Some observations related to the equilibrium are worth attention. First, when does the salvage 
of used product j for enterprise j, 𝑏𝑗𝑗, influence the enterprises’ sales and profits? It’s more difficult 
for an enterprise that has a lower market share in the last cycle to grab the market or maintain the 
market share. When the market share of enterprise i is 0.75 in the last cycle, 𝛼 = 0.75, enterprise 
s needs more advanced remanufacturing technology to keep the salvage of used product s for 
enterprise s three times of that of i, 𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 3𝑏𝑖𝑖. On the contrary, enterprise i, which had a larger 
market share in the last cycle, can easily grab the market. 
Second, the lower salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗, the smaller total discount 𝑣𝑗𝑗
𝑏∗. It is rational that enterprises 
collect used products of lower salvage to reduce the total discount. The total discount is about 1 3⁄  
of the salvage, and especially, when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑠𝑠, the total discount is exactly 
1
3⁄  of the salvage, 
𝑣𝑗𝑗
𝑏∗ = 1 3⁄ 𝑏𝑗𝑗. 
Third, consumers get 2 3⁄  of salvage value. Compared with model a, consumers get the total 
14 
 
trade-in discount and lower price for the new product in Case 1. The whole difference value is 
exact 2 3⁄  of the salvage value, and the enterprise get the rest 
1
3⁄ . The utility of the used product 
is almost none to consumers, but valuable to enterprises. Both consumers and enterprises benefit 
from trade-in transactions. 
4.2 Case 2 
In Case 2, both enterprises adopt the flexible trade-in strategy. Market segments remain, but 
consumers can purchase any products through trade-in, as shown in Figure 4. Compared to Case 
1, some utility functions change. In segment 1, the utility consumers derived from purchasing 
products of enterprise s can be reformulated as 
 𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑃𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠𝑖 . (10) 
In segment 2, the utility consumers derived from purchasing products of enterprise i can be 
reformulated as 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑠. (11) 
By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both market segments, indifferent consumer’s locations in two market 
segments can be defined as 𝑥1
𝑑 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑠𝑖)
2𝑡
 and 𝑥2
𝑑 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
. In 
market segment 1, consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent 
consumers in segment 1 will choose enterprise i, and the rest consumers will choose enterprise s. 
In market segment 2, the situation is similar. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
In Case 2, two enterprises still pursue maximal profit. Considering the total discount and the 
changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑑 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝑥1
𝑑 + (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠)(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝑑 , (12) 
 𝜋𝑠
𝑑 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖)𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝑑) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝑑). (13) 
Solving the first order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprise yields the 
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. When both enterprises take a flexible trade-in strategy, the equilibrium prices are 
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𝑃𝑠
𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
𝑑∗ + 𝐾3 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, 
𝑃𝑖
𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑖 +
3𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑑∗ + 𝐾2 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, 
the equilibrium sales are 
𝑞𝑖
𝑑∗ =
𝐾2 + 𝛼(𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖) − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
6𝑡
, 
𝑞𝑠
𝑑∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑑∗, 
the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are 
3𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑑∗ = 2𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠, 
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑑∗ = 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠, 
and the equilibrium profits are 
𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ =
𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
𝜋𝑠
𝑑∗ =
𝛼(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠, 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1, and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1. 
Some observations related to the equilibrium are worth attention. First, the greater the gap in 
remanufacturing technology between the two enterprises, the easier it is for the leading enterprises 
to seize the market. As 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 increase, the technology gap wider, sales of 
enterprise i increase and sales of s decrease when market share in the last cycle, 𝛼, is constant. 
For the illustrative purpose, Figure 5 shows an example. When 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠 are 
close to −0.3, the difference between sales of i and s is getting lager. Meanwhile, when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖 
and 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠  are close to 0.3 , the difference disappeared first, then became negative. The 
remanufacturing technology advantage eliminates the gap in market share. 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
4.3 Case 3 
In Case 3, enterprise i switches to the flexible trade-in strategy, while enterprise s sticks to 
the simple one. Consumers in market segment 2, where they own the used products of enterprise 
s, can purchase any products through trade-in. But consumers in the market segment 1 has the 
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trade-in option only for enterprise i’s products rather than enterprise s’ products. And Figure 6 
shows the Hotelling lines in two market segments. 
Compared to Case 1, some utility functions change. In segment 2, the utility consumers 
derived from purchasing products of enterprise i can be reformulated as 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑠. (14) 
By letting 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑠 in both segments, indifferent consumer’s locations in two segments can 
be defined as 𝑥1
𝑐 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑠𝑖)
2𝑡
 and 𝑥2
𝑐 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
. In market segment 1, 
consumers whose mismatch with enterprise i is smaller than that of indifferent consumers in 
segment 1 choose enterprise i, and the rest choose enterprise s. In market segment 2, the situation 
is similar. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
In Case 3, two enterprises still pursue maximal profit. Considering the total discount and the 
changed sales, the enterprises’ profit function can be reformulated as 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑐 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝑥1
𝑐𝑐1 + (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠)(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝑐, (15) 
 𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠)𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝑐) + (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝑐). (16) 
Solving the first order conditions for the two profit-maximizing enterprise yields the 
equilibrium prices, total discount, profits, and sales, as summarized by Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3. When both enterprise i take flexible trade-in strategy, and enterprise s simple, the 
equilibrium prices are 
𝑃𝑠
𝑐∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, 
𝑃𝑖
𝑐∗ = 2𝑃𝑠
𝑐∗ + 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑆 − 𝑡 − 𝐶𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑐∗, 
the equilibrium sales are 
𝑞𝑖
𝑐∗ =
𝐾2 + 𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
6𝑡
, 
𝑞𝑠
𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑞𝑖
𝑐∗, 
the equilibrium total trade-in discounts are 
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𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑐∗ =
2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠
3
, 
𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑐∗ − 𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑐∗ = 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 2𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑐∗, 
and the equilibrium profits are 
𝜋𝑖
𝑐∗ =
𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
𝜋𝑠
𝑐∗ =
𝛼(𝐾3 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾3 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
2
18𝑡
, 
where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠, 𝐾2 = 3𝑡 + 𝐾1, and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1. 
Combined with Lemmas 1, 2 and 3, it can be found that 𝑞𝑠
𝑏∗ > 𝑞𝑠
𝑐∗ < 𝑞𝑠
𝑑∗ and 𝜋𝑠
𝑏∗ > 𝜋𝑠
𝑐∗ <
𝜋𝑠
𝑑∗ . Whether considering market share or corporate profits, Case 3 is always the worst-case 
scenario for enterprise s. When the enterprise i adopts the flexible trade-in strategy, the best choice 
of the enterprise s is also the flexible trade-in strategy, corresponding to Case 2. In the smartphone 
industry, as an example, when Apple moved from the simple trade-in strategy to the flexible, the 
other enterprises had to take the same action, or they would suffer the loss of market share and 
profit. 
 
5. Simple versus Flexible  
Which trade-in strategy do enterprises prefer? Is the better performance strategy a greener 
one? To get the answer, the equilibria in the two cases are compared, and their environmental 
performance is also assessed. 
When one enterprise adopts trade-in strategies, first simple and then flexible, the other is 
likely to do the same due to marketing and financial pressures (see Appendix B for more 
information). The more interesting question is: in which situation is an enterprise likely to switch 
from the simple trade-in strategy to the flexible strategy? The answer to this question is rooted in 
enterprise profit and sales changes between Case 1 and Case 2. Accordingly, comparing the 
equilibrium sales of two cases summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2 yields the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑖𝑠 > 𝛼𝑏𝑠𝑖, the sales of enterprise i increase more in Case 2 than in Case 
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1, while those of enterprise s decrease. 
The illustration of Proposition 1, as shown in Fig.7 provides additional insights. For sales, 
enterprise i wants to keep the simple-simple situation (Case 1) when it has a high market share (𝛼), 
but prefers the flexible-flexible situation (Case 2) otherwise. In addition to market share, 
remanufacturing capability matters as well. When enterprise i has an advantage in remanufacturing 
(the salvage 𝑏𝑖𝑠 is bigger than 𝑏𝑠𝑖), it has more incentive to switch to flexible-flexible situation. 
For an enterprise that has a high market share, even a bigger remanufacturing effort (e.g., 
technology investment) is needed for flexible trade-in to sustain the same level of sales. 
[Insert Figure 7 here] 
To better understand Proposition 1, the sales of two enterprises in two market segments are 
analyzed across two cases. In the two cases, the market is segmented as shown in Figure 8. When 
owners of enterprise j’s products buy its competitor's new products, they are no longer loyal 
customers. In the last cycle, all consumers in segment 1, 𝛼, buy the products of enterprise i, but 
in this cycle, some of them “betray” in both Case 1 and 2. While such betrayals exist all the time 
in either segment, their numbers depend on indifferent consumers’ locations. For example, the 
percentage of betrayals in segment 1 of Case 1 is equal to 1 minus 𝑥1
𝑏, the indifferent consumer’s 
location. The number of betrayals in segment 1 of Case 1 is equal to this percentage multiplied by 
the size of segment 1, 𝛼. The indifferent consumer’s location is the key to the number of betrayals. 
In segment 1, the more it positions to the left, the bigger number of betrayals, and the opposite 
holds for segment 2. Four indifferent consumer’s locations are marked in figure 8. It can be 
observed that 𝑥1
𝑑 is to the left of 𝑥1
𝑏 and 𝑥2
𝑏 is to the left of 𝑥2
𝑑, which means more betrayals in 
Case 2 than in Case 1 in both segments. 
[Insert Figure 8 here] 
Table 4 lists the indifferent consumer’s locations in two market segments, and the difference 
reaches the same conclusion numerically. We know the difference of ratio of betrayal between 
Case 1 and 2, and the key factors making the difference are 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠. The higher the 𝑏𝑠𝑖 or 
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𝑏𝑖𝑠, the higher the ratio of betrayal in segment 1 or 2. It is interesting that improving the salvage 
value of used products made by competitors in remanufacturing can induce the betrayal of regular 
consumers of competitors. This provides an impetus for enterprises to improve remanufacturing 
technology. The salvages, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖𝑠, and the sizes of market segments influence the sales of 
enterprises in the way of proposition 1. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Proposition 2. If 𝛼[𝑏𝑠𝑖
2 − 2(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑠𝑖] > (𝛼 − 1)[𝑏𝑖𝑠
2 + 2(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)𝑏𝑖𝑠], where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 +
3𝑡, the profits of enterprise i increase more in Case 2 than Case 1, while those of enterprise s 
decrease. 
Fig.9 illustrates Proposition 2 from the perspective of profitability. The insights obtained were 
similar to those based on the illustration of Proposition 1 from the perspective of sales. Enterprise 
i prefers the simple-simple situation (Case 1) when market share (𝛼) is high, but the flexible-
flexible situation (Case 2) when 𝛼 is low. An advantage in remanufacturing (the salvage ratio 
increase) will make the flexible-flexible situation more attractive. An enterprise enjoying a high 
market share, however, is reluctant to make the switch due to the additional efforts required by 
flexible trade-in that may hurt its profitability. 
[Insert Figure 9 here] 
From the government perspective in terms of environment protection, Case 1 and Case 2 are 
further compared through the assessment of carbon emission for manufacturing new or 
remanufactured products. The carbon emission of making each new product is denoted as 𝑒𝑖𝑛 or 
𝑒𝑠𝑛, and each remanufactured product 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 or 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟. For instance, the carbon emission 
of enterprise i making a remanufactured product with a used product made by enterprise s is 
denoted as 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟. 
To assess the environmental performance for Case 1, this study obtains the total emission of 
two enterprises with the following function: 
 𝐶𝐸𝑏 = 𝑒𝑖𝑛(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝑏 + 𝑒𝑠𝑛𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝑏) + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝛼𝑥1
𝑏 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝑏). (17) 
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For Case 2: 
 𝐶𝐸𝑑 = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝑑 + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝑑) + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟𝛼𝑥1
𝑑 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝑑). (18) 
Proposition 3. If 𝛼[(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (𝑒𝑠𝑛 − 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟)(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑖𝑖)] + (1 − 𝛼)[(𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)𝑏𝑖𝑠 −
(𝑒𝑖𝑛 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡, the total carbon emission is more in Case 2 
than in Case 1, 𝐶𝐸𝑑 > 𝐶𝐸𝑏. 
As shown in Proposition 3, the flexible-flexible situation yields more carbon emission than 
the simple-simple one. For sales and profits, enterprises may switch from the simple trade-in 
strategy to the flexible one at the cost of the environment. In order to reinforce the fulfillment of 
corporate social responsibility, the government may resort to the carbon tax mechanism, as 
discussed in the next section. 
In Case 2, all consumers choose to participate in trade-in. With more used products recycled, 
how can there more carbon emission than in Case 1? Not just the carbon emission of the 
manufacturing unit new product is more than that of remanufacturing, 𝑒𝑗𝑛 > 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟, where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠} 
and 𝑘 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑠}, but also the carbon emission of enterprise j remanufacturing with used products 
made by k is more than that of enterprise k, 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟>𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑟. In addition, the sales of each enterprise in 
two market segments differ in Case 1 and Case 2. Two examples are given below to illustrate the 
paradox. 
As shown in Figure 10, when 𝑏𝑖𝑠 and 𝑏𝑠𝑖 are small enough, carbon emission in Case 1 is 
more than that in Case 2; as they increase, the carbon emission in Case 2 gradually exceeds that in 
Case 1. The parameters set as 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2 , 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15 , 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34 and 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25 , which 
mean the carbon emission of enterprise j remanufacturing with its own used products is less than 
that of it remanufacturing with its competitor’s, or 𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑟 < 𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑟 . In addition, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25 and 
𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, which mean carbon emission of j manufacturing a new product is more than that of k 
remanufacturing with a used product made by j, or 𝑒𝑘𝑗𝑟 < 𝑒𝑗𝑛. When 𝑏𝑗𝑘 increases, the ratio of 
betrayal increases in both segments, as more consumers trade in the used products made by j to its 
competitor for new ones. 
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[Insert Figure 10 here] 
Similarly, Figure 11 shows that when 𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑠𝑠 is small enough, carbon emission in Case 
1 is more than that in Case 2. As 𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑏𝑠𝑠 increase, the carbon emission in Case 2 gradually 
exceeds that in Case 1. 
[Insert Figure 11 here] 
As shown in Figure 12, the carbon emission caused by consumers located between 𝑥1
𝑑∗ and 
𝑥1
𝑑 in segment 1 increases, and that caused by consumers located between 𝑥1
𝑑 and 1 decreases. 
This makes it possible for the carbon emission in Case 2 to be larger than that in Case 1. When 
𝑏𝑗𝑘 is big enough, the carbon emission of Case 2 is equal to that in Case 1. 
[Insert Figure 12 here] 
The above analysis confirms that Case 2 may produce more emission in total. The next section 
will address how to mitigate the negative impact by employing the carbon tax policy. 
 
6. Carbon Tax Policies 
For the purpose of emission reduction, it is a common practice for the government to levy 
carbon tax. When the taxation policy is introduced, will flexible trade-in strategy still be attractive 
to enterprises? In this section, basic carbon tax is denoted as c and preferential carbon tax denoted 
as 𝜌𝑐 . The preferential carbon tax is designed for remanufactured products, which are more 
environment-friendly due to lower unit emission. 
First, Case CT (Carbon Tax) is established in which basic carbon tax is levied on all products. 
Case CT is solved in a way similar to Case 2 in Lemma 2. As the two enterprises need to pay 
carbon tax for their products, the profits function can be reformulated as: 
 𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)𝛼𝑥1
𝐶𝑇
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝐶𝑇 ,
 (19) 
 𝜋𝑠
𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟)𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝐶𝑇)
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝐶𝑇).
 (20) 
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Second, Case DCT (Differentiated Carbon Tax) is established to accommodate preferential 
carbon tax for environment-friendly products. In this case, preferential carbon tax applies when 
enterprise j engages in remanufacturing with used products made by itself. The profits function 
can be reformulated as: 
 𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)𝛼𝑥1
𝐷𝐶𝑇
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)𝑥2
𝐷𝐶𝑇 ,
 (21) 
 𝜋𝑠
𝐷𝐶𝑇 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟)𝛼(1 − 𝑥1
𝐷𝐶𝑇)
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑥2
𝐷𝐶𝑇).
 (22) 
Proposition 4. Carbon emission in Case CT is lower than that in Case 2 all time; if 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 < 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 
and 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 < 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟, carbon emission in Case DCT is lower than that in Case CT. Carbon tax policy is 
effective in controlling greenhouse gas emission. 
The carbon tax policy urges enterprises to produce more environment-friendly products, 
lowering the total carbon emission. An example is given in Figure 13: when carbon tax rate 
increases, total carbon emission in both Case CT and Case DCT decreases, while the latter 
outperforms the former. Therefore, the preferential carbon tax policy favoring environment-
friendly products is more effective than the basic one. 
[Insert Figure 13 here] 
Proposition 5. Carbon tax policy does not always mean a loss of profits. If 𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)
2 +
2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖)] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)
2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0 ,  
where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡 , the profit of enterprise i is higher in Case CT than in Case 2; 
if  𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)
2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖)] + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑐(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)
2 +
2(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡, the profit of enterprise i is higher in 
Case DCT than in Case 2. 
When carbon tax is levied, it may have a positive impact on an enterprise’s profitability. As 
shown in Figure 14, when carbon tax rate c increases within the low range (below 0.4-0.5), the 
profit of enterprise i decreases. When it continues rising in the high range, however, the profit of 
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enterprise i increases in both Case Tax and Case DCT. Beyond the carbon tax rate of around 0.8, 
the profit of enterprise i is even higher in Case DCT than in Case 2. Thus, a strong preferential 
carbon tax policy is conducive to the healthy development of the remanufacturing industry. 
[Insert Figure 14 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
The purpose of the trade-in is to protect the environment by recycling used products for 
remanufacturing. In order to meet the needs of consumers, many enterprises have adopted the 
flexible trade-in strategy to replace the simple one, but such a practice may compromise the 
environment protection purpose. This study focuses on enterprise choice between simple and 
flexible trade-in strategies in terms of their business and environment impacts considering carbon 
tax mechanism. The findings suggest that remanufacturing based on simple trade-in is optimal for 
both environment and business. Flexible trade-in is more of a marketing strategy that attracts 
consumers from competitors but increases total emission. 
The findings yield some helpful implications for managers and policy-makers: 
a. Being the first enterprise to implement a trade-in program (simple or flexible) helps 
capture more market share. The other enterprises are better off to follow suit, or lose their 
edge. In reality, it is recommended that an enterprise adopt the same trade-in strategy as 
its competitor’s. 
b. Whether an enterprise shall be the first one to take a simple or flexible trade-in strategy 
depends on certain conditions. An enterprise having a relatively large market share wants 
to be the first to offer consumers the simple trade-in opportunity, and an enterprise having 
relatively small market share wants to make the flexible trade-in option available. An 
advantage in remanufacturing technology also motivates an enterprise to adopt the flexible 
trade-in strategy. 
c. The flexible trade-in strategy is less effective in cutting down carbon emission than the 
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simple trade-in strategy. The carbon tax mechanism helps enterprises fulfill their corporate 
social responsibility by making an environment-sensible choice between simple and 
flexible trade-in strategies. 
The trade-in activity is designed for environment protection by reducing pollution in the 
manufacturing process. The flexible trade-in strategy provides consumers with more flexibility, 
but it may not be more environmentally friendly than the simple one. It is necessary for the 
government to implement environmental policies, such as carbon tax, to guide enterprises to 
choose greener strategies. 
Enterprises must use the flexible trade-in strategy with caution. It is true that one enterprise 
may get more profit by taking the flexible trade-in strategy when competitors are taking the simple 
one. But profit will diminish when competitors switch to the flexible one as well. Actually, the 
profit may be lower than the previous phase when enterprises all take the simple trade-in strategy. 
It is up to the government to avoid the damage to both the environment and industry by 
discouraging enterprises from using flexible trade-in strategy. 
This study has limitations that point to future research. The single-cycle models established 
are simpler but not very realistic, and they can be extended to multiple-cycle ones in the future. 
Also, a marketplace for used product exchange is likely to improve the utilization rate of used 
products. Further analyses may consider the possibility that enterprises trade used products with 
each other. Finally, cap-and-trade policy can be included to compare with carbon tax in terms of 
similar or different roles that they play in corporate choice of trade-in strategies. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1. As 𝑞𝑖
𝑏 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+α𝑣𝑖𝑖−(1−𝛼)𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
, we can rewrite the two profit functions 
as 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑏 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡
α
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
(1 − 𝛼)
, (A.1) 
 
𝜋𝑠
𝑏 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡
] α
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
] (1 − 𝛼)
. (A.2) 
Using the first-order conditions, 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑏
∂𝑣𝑖𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑏
∂𝑃𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑏
∂𝑣𝑠𝑠
= 0 and 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑏
∂𝑃𝑠
= 0, we have 
 𝑃𝑖
𝑏 = 𝐶𝑖 +
𝐾2−𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, (A.3) 
 𝑃𝑠
𝑏 = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝐾3−𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, (A.4) 
 𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑏 =
2𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, (A.5) 
 𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑏 =
2𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
. (A.6) 
The second-order conditions are negative in both cases. The four equations above yield the 
equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖
𝑏∗ , 𝑃𝑠
𝑏∗ , 𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑏∗ and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑏∗ in Lemma 1. We can then drive the equilibrium 
𝑞𝑖
𝑏∗, 𝑞𝑠
𝑏∗ , 𝜋𝑖
𝑏∗ and 𝜋𝑠
𝑏∗ using the equilibrium prices. 
Proof of Lemma 2. As 𝑞𝑖
𝑑 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+α(𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑠𝑖)+(1−𝛼)(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
, we can rewrite the two profit 
functions as 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑑 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑠𝑖
2𝑡
α
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
(1 − 𝛼)
, (A.7) 
 
𝜋𝑠
𝑑 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑠𝑖
2𝑡
] α
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
] (1 − 𝛼)
. (A.8) 
Using the first-order conditions,
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑑
∂𝑣𝑖𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑑
∂𝑃𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑑
∂𝑣𝑠𝑠
= 0 and 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑑
∂𝑃𝑠
= 0, we have 
 𝑃𝑠
𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
3𝑣𝑠𝑖
𝑑∗+𝐾3−2𝑏𝑠𝑖−𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, (A.9) 
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 𝑃𝑖
𝑑∗ = 𝐶𝑖 +
3𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑑∗+𝐾2−2𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠
3
, (A.10) 
 3𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑑∗ = 2𝑏𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑠𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠, (A.11) 
 3𝑣𝑠𝑖
𝑑∗ − 3𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑑∗ = 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑖𝑠. (A.12) 
And the second-order conditions are negative in both cases. Then the four equations above 
yield the equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖
𝑑∗ ,  𝑃𝑠
𝑑∗ ,  𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑑∗ and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑑∗ in Lemma 2. We can then drive the 
equilibrium 𝑞𝑖
𝑑∗, 𝑞𝑠
𝑑∗ , 𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ and 𝜋𝑠
𝑑∗ using the equilibrium prices. 
Proof of Lemma 3. As 𝑞𝑖
𝑐 =
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+α𝑣𝑖𝑖+(1−𝛼)(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
 , we can rewrite the two profit 
functions as 
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑐 = (𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖−𝑣𝑖𝑠
2𝑡
α
+(𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖𝑠 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠)
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+(𝑣𝑖𝑠−𝑣𝑠𝑠)
2𝑡
(1 − 𝛼)
, (A.13) 
 
𝜋𝑠
𝑐 = (𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑖
2𝑡
] α
+(𝑃𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠 − 𝑣𝑠𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠𝑠) [1 −
𝑢𝑖−𝑢𝑠−(𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑠)+𝑡−𝑣𝑠𝑠
2𝑡
] (1 − 𝛼)
. (A.14) 
Using the first-order conditions, 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑐
∂𝑣𝑖𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑖
𝑐
∂𝑃𝑖
= 0, 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑐
∂𝑣𝑠𝑠
= 0 and 
∂𝜋𝑠
𝑐
∂𝑃𝑠
= 0, we have 
 𝑃𝑠
𝑐∗ = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝐾3−𝑏𝑖𝑖
3
, (A.15) 
 𝑃𝑖
𝑐∗ = 2𝑃𝑠
𝑐∗ + 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑆 − 𝑡 − 𝐶𝑠 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑐∗, (A.16) 
 𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑐∗ =
2𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑖+𝑏𝑖𝑠
3
, (A.17) 
 𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑐∗ − 𝑣𝑖𝑠
𝑐∗ = 𝑏𝑠𝑠 − 2𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑐∗. (A.18) 
And the second-order conditions are negative in both cases. Then the four equations above 
yield the equilibrium prices of 𝑃𝑖
𝑐∗ ,  𝑃𝑠
𝑐∗ ,  𝑣𝑖𝑖
𝑐∗  and 𝑣𝑠𝑠
𝑐∗  Lemma 3. We can then drive the 
equilibrium 𝑞𝑖
𝑐∗, 𝑞𝑠
𝑐∗ , 𝜋𝑖
𝑐∗ and 𝜋𝑠
𝑐∗ using the equilibrium prices. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Because 𝑞𝑖
𝑑∗ =
𝐾2
6𝑡
−
−𝛼(𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖)+(1−𝛼)(𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠)
6𝑡
  and 𝑞𝑖
𝑏∗ =
𝐾2
6t
−
−𝛼𝑏𝑖𝑖+(1−𝛼)𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
 , 𝑞𝑖
𝑑∗ >  𝑞𝑖
𝑏∗ if and only if −𝛼𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑏𝑖𝑠 > 0 . The same reason applies to 
manufacture s. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Because 𝜋𝑖
𝑏∗ =
𝛼(𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖)
2+(1−𝛼)(𝐾2−𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
  and 𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ =
30 
 
𝛼(𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖)
2+(1−𝛼)(𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠)
2
18𝑡
 ,  𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ > 𝜋𝑖
𝑏∗  if and only if 𝛼[𝑏𝑠𝑖
2 − 2(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑠𝑖] + (1 −
𝛼)[𝑏𝑖𝑠
2 + 2(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)𝑏𝑖𝑠] > 0, where 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡. The same reason applies to manufacture s. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Because CE𝑏∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑛
 𝐾2−𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑛
𝐾3−𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡
α + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟
 𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡
α +
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟
𝐾3+𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼)  and CE𝑑∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟
 𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟
𝐾3+𝑏𝑠𝑖−𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡
α + 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟
 𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖
6𝑡
α +
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟
𝐾3−𝑏𝑖𝑠+𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼) , CE𝑑∗ > CE𝑏∗  if and only if α[(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)𝑏𝑠𝑖 + (𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑛)(𝐾3 −
𝑏𝑖𝑖)] + (1 − 𝛼)[(𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)𝑏𝑖𝑠 + (𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑛)(𝐾2 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0 , where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 , 
𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡 and 𝐾3 = 3𝑡 − 𝐾1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Because 𝐶𝐸𝑑∗ = 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟
𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼) + 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟
𝐾3+𝑏𝑠𝑖−𝑏𝑖𝑖
6𝑡
𝛼 +
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟
𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖
6𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟
𝐾3−𝑏𝑖𝑠+𝑏𝑠𝑠
6𝑡
(1 − 𝛼) , 𝐶𝐸𝐶𝑇∗ =
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟(𝐾2−𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟+𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖)𝛼
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟(𝐾3−𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟−𝑏𝑖𝑖+𝑏𝑠𝑖)𝛼
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟(𝐾2−𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟+𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1−𝛼)
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟(𝐾3−𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟+𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠)(1−𝛼)
6𝑡
 and 
𝐶𝐸𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ =
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟(𝐾2−𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟+𝑏𝑖𝑖−𝑏𝑠𝑖)𝛼
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟(𝐾3−𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟+𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟−𝑏𝑖𝑖+𝑏𝑠𝑖)𝛼
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟(𝐾2−𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟+𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟+𝑏𝑖𝑠−𝑏𝑠𝑠)(1−𝛼)
6𝑡
+
𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟(𝐾3−𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟+𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟+𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠)(1−𝛼)
6𝑡
.  
CE𝐶𝑇∗ − CE𝑑∗ is equivalent to −𝛼(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)
2 < (1 − 𝛼)(𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 − 𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)
2, and CE𝐶𝑇∗ <
CE𝑑∗, where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠and 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡. 
CE𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ < CE𝐶𝑇∗ if and only if 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 < 0 and 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 < 0. 
Proof of proposition5. Because 𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ =
1
18𝑡
[𝛼(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆𝑆)
2] , 
𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑇∗ =
1
18𝑡
[𝛼(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 − 𝑏𝑆𝑆)
2] 
and 𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝐶𝑇∗ =
1
18𝑡
[𝛼(𝐾2 − 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 + 𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑆𝑖)
2 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝐾2 − 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑆𝑟 + 𝜌𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑟 + 𝑏𝑖𝑆 −
𝑏𝑆𝑆)
2]. Where 𝐾1 = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑠 − 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑠 and 𝐾2 = 𝐾1 + 3𝑡. 
𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ < 𝜋𝑖
𝐶𝑇∗  if and only if  𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)
2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖)] + (1 −
𝛼)[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)
2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0. 
𝜋𝑖
𝑑∗ < 𝜋𝑖
𝐷𝐶𝑇∗  if and only if  𝛼[𝑐(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)
2 + 2(𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 − 𝜌𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖)] + (1 −
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𝛼)[𝑐(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)
2 + 2(𝜌𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 − 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟)(𝐾2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝑠)] > 0. 
 
Appendix B 
This appendix illustrates why enterprise s takes the same simple trade-in strategy as enterprise 
i had taken, by comparing Combination b and Combination e in terms of enterprise profit. 
Combination e where enterprise i takes simple trade-in strategy and enterprise s takes none trade-
in strategy is modeled, with consumer utility function in Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (6), and enterprise 
profit function in Eq. (5) and Eq. (8). Solving the first-order conditions for the two profit-
maximizing enterprises yields the equilibrium profit: 
 𝜋𝑠
𝑒∗ =
𝛼(𝐾3−2𝑏𝑖𝑖)(𝐾3−
𝑏𝑖𝑖
2
)+(1−𝛼)(𝐾3−2𝑏𝑖𝑖)(𝐾3+𝑏𝑖𝑖)
18𝑡
. (B.1) 
Based on the equilibrium profits of enterprise s in Combination b (as shown in Lemma 1) and 
Combination e (as shown in Eq. B.1), there is: 
 𝜋𝑠
𝑏∗ − 𝜋𝑠
𝑒∗ =
𝛼
𝑏𝑖𝑖
2
𝐾3+(1−𝛼)(2𝑏𝑖𝑖
2+𝑏𝑠𝑠
2+𝐾3(2𝑏𝑠𝑠+𝑏𝑖𝑖))
18𝑡
> 0. (B.2) 
Enterprise s gets more profit in Combination b than Combination e, and enterprise s will take 
the same simple trade-in strategy as enterprise i has taken. Similarly, it can be verified that 
enterprise s will take the same flexible trade-in strategy as enterprise i has taken. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Consumers’ buying options and the responding utilities 
Figure 2. Hotelling line of model-a 
Figure 3. Hotelling line in Case 1 
Figure 4. Hotelling line in Case 2 
Figure 5. Sales of two enterprises with the different remanufacturing technology gap 
Figure 6. Hotelling line in Case 3 
Figure 7. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in 
strategy choice 
Figure 8. The segment of the market in two cases 
Figure 9. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in 
strategy choice 
Figure 10. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑘 
Figure 11. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗 
Figure 12. The carbon emission caused by consumers in Case 2 
Figure 13. Total carbon emission with different carbon tax rate c 
Figure 14. Profit of enterprise i with different carbon tax rate c 
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Figure 1. Consumers’ buying options and the responding utilities 
 
Figure 2. Hotelling line of model-a 
 
Figure 3. Hotelling lines in Case 1 
 
Figure 4. Hotelling lines in Case 2 
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Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7 
Figure 5. Sales of two enterprises with the different remanufacturing technology gap 
 
Figure 6. Hotelling lines in Case 3 
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Figure 7. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in 
strategy choice (with ratio 𝑏𝑖𝑠 𝑏𝑠𝑖⁄ ). 
 
Figure 8. The segment of the market in two cases 
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Figure 9. The impact of market segment size and salvage difference on enterprises’ trade-in 
strategy choice (with ratio 
𝑏𝑖𝑠
2+2(𝐾2−𝑏𝑠𝑠)𝑏𝑖𝑠
𝑏𝑠𝑖
2−2(𝐾2+𝑏𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑠𝑖
). 
 
 
Note: This example sets 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 =
0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑒𝑠𝑛 = 0.3, 𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 0.3, 𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 0.2 
Figure 10. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑘 
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Note: This example sets 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 =
0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑒𝑠𝑛 = 0.3, 𝑒𝑖𝑛 = 0.4, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15 
Figure 11. Carbons emission with different salvage 𝑏𝑗𝑗 
 
Figure 12. The carbon emission caused by consumers in Case 2 
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Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 0.7 
Figure 13. Total carbon emission with different carbon tax rate c 
 
Note: In this example, we set 𝐶𝑖 = 0.4, 𝐶𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑢𝑖 = 0.4, 𝑢𝑠 = 0.3, 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝛼 = 0.7, 
𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 0.15, 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑟 = 0.34, 𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟 = 0.25, 𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 0.1, 𝑏𝑠𝑖 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 0.7 
Figure 14. Profit of enterprise i with different carbon tax rate c 
